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Using the results of risk-adjusted linear-quadratic-Gaussian optimal control with perfect and 
imperfect observation of the economy, we obtain prudent Taylor rules for monetary policies 
and also allow for imperfect information and cautious Kalman filters. A prudent central bank 
adjusts the nominal interest rate more aggressively to changes in the inflation gap, especially 
if the volatility of cost-push shocks is large. If the interest rate impacts the output gap after a 
lag, the interest also responds to the output gap, especially with strong persistence in 
aggregate demand. Prudence pushes up this reaction coefficient as well. If data are poor and 
appear with a lag, a prudent central bank responds less strongly to new measurements of the 
output gap. However, prudence attenuates this policy reaction and biases the prediction of the 
output gap upwards, particularly if output targeting is important. Finally, prudence requires an 
extra upward (downward) bias in its estimate of the output gap before it feeds into the policy 
rule if inflation is above (below) target. This reinforces nominal interest rate reactions. A 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most precious commodities of a modern capitalist economy is a stable price level 
or at least a low inflation rate. Central banks also attempt to avoid unemployment and steer 
towards near-zero output gaps. This form of flexible inflation targeting gives rise to Taylor 
(1993) rules, which indicate how much the nominal interest rate should react to the inflation 
gap and the output gap. One of the main features of a central bank is that it operates 
cautiously and prudently: 
“A prudent man (or perhaps, I should say a prudent Bayesian) carries an umbrella 
even when the forecast says there is only a small chance of rain. If there is no rain, 
he suffers the small inconvenience of carrying the umbrella. But if he does not bring 
the umbrella and it does rain, he may suffer the much larger inconvenience of being 
caught in a downpour. The prudent central bank should behave similarly, accepting 
a high probability of a small adverse outcome in order to avoid the small risk of a 
very serious bad outcome” (Feldstein, 2003). 
Feldstein argues that Greenspan’s policy of lowering the federal interest rate from 1.75 per 
cent to 1.25 per cent last year was prudent, because of the asymmetric nature of the risk faced 
at that time. The potential upturn could loose steam and there was a risk of deflation, while an 
unnecessarily strong stimulus could do little harm at the time. A large body of research on 
optimal monetary policy is based on the certainty equivalence principle, which says that 
uncertainty can be ignored. In calculating optimal interest rate rules future disturbances are 
set to their expected values. This approach is only valid under very special conditions (i.e., 
linear models, quadratic preferences, normally distributed errors). It abstracts from prudence 
and thus bears little relation to the practice of central banking. 
It is surprising that there is so little research on the behaviour of prudent central banks. 
One of the reasons is that this requires departure from the certainty-equivalent linear-
quadratic-Gaussian framework that is usually adopted in the macroeconomic literature (e.g., 
Svensson, 1997; Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999; Judd and Rotemberg, 1998; Rotemberg and 
Woodford, 1997, 1999; Woodford, 2001). One popular approach is to explicitly recognise 
that statistical properties and order of the processes driving the modelling disturbances are not 
known and to derive robust (min-max) rules that perform well under different views of the 
world (e.g., Onatski and Stock, 2000; Giannoni and Woodford, 2002; Onatski and Williams, 
2003). Another approach is to employ model averaging in a Bayesian context (Brock, Durlauf 
and West, 2003). Yet another approach advocates room for judgement of central bankers in 
the derivation of optimal monetary policy rules (Svensson, 2002).   2
  Our approach is complementary to these three approaches. We allow for 
precautionary behaviour of central banks and derive closed-loop monetary policy rules 
analytically. We allow for temporal risk aversion by assuming that the central bank mnimises 
the expected value of an exponential transformation of the quadratic welfare loss criterion in 
terms of output and inflation. The coefficient of the exponential transformation corresponds to 
an Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, but it also allows for prudence in the 
optimal policy rules. One of the advantages of our approach is that it leads to linear policy 
rules with reaction coefficients that depend on the covariance matrices of the stochastic 
process driving the modelling disturbances (Jacobson, 1973; Speyer, Deyst and Jacobson, 
1974; Whittle, 1981). Effectively, a prudent policy maker downplays the power of its 
instruments if the volatility of shocks hitting the economy is large. 
  The derivation of monetary policy rules must recognise that national accounts consist 
of poor quality data. They contain many measurement errors and observation lags. This 
problem is particularly severe for output data. Typically, various ‘flash’ estimates of GDP 
appear fairly quickly and are then subsequently substantially revised. Measurement errors 
show up, because the raw data do not satisfy the national accounting identities. Various 
studies have used subjective estimates of the reliability of data to adjust the data under the 
restriction that all the accounting identities must be satisfied (e.g., van der Ploeg, 1982; 
Barker, van der Ploeg and Weale, 1984). The subjective variances of the raw data are 
provided by the national accountants and subsequently reduced by imposing the accounting 
restrictions. Unfortunately, they are seldom used in econometric analysis or in the derivation 
of optimal economic policy rules. Here we allow for measurement errors and lags in the 
observation of output data (cf., Orphanides, 2000). If the central bank adjusts its interest rate 
in reaction to changes in output gaps, it presumably does this less intensively if substantial 
measurement errors and lags in output data cause a deterioration of the signal-to-noise ratio 
(cf., Rudebusch, 2001). Taylor rules also allow for reactions to changes in inflation. However, 
inflation data are more readily and accurately available than output data. 
We investigate how measurement errors and lags in output data affect the Taylor rule 
for the nominal interest rate. Pearlman (1986, 1992) demonstrated the usefulness of the 
Kalman filter for predicting the states of the economy in monetary models with forward-
looking expectations. In backward-looking models and forward-looking models where policy 
makers and private agents have access to the same partial information sets, the Kalman filter 
calculations can be performed independently of deriving the optimal monetary policy rule. 
The separation of control and prediction is more tricky in forward-looking monetary models 
with commitment and asymmetric information (cf., Svensson and Woodford, 2003).   3
In general, optimal predictions of the output gap make use of wage and price data. 
We analyse how a prudent central banker takes account of incoming unreliable output data 
and uses this in the Taylor rule. A modified separation principle holds (Whittle, 1981). The 
prudent Kalman filter depends on welfare preferences and yields biased predictions. In 
particular, a prudent policy maker gives less weight to new observations with large standard 
errors and that are less relevant for welfare. Conversely, to avoid costly mistakes prudence 
requires more weight to faulty data that are relevant for welfare. In the umbrella example a 
prudent person assigns a larger subjective probability of rain than the objective probability of 
rain, especially if he or she dislikes rain a lot. 
Section 2 states the general mathematical problem of risk-adjusted LQG control and 
prediction. Prudence implies that the policy maker plays a min-max game against nature. The 
policy maker hedges against undesirable outcomes by postulating that shocks damage its 
objectives even though, from a purely statistical point of view, they do not hurt on average. It 
still leads to linear feedback policy rules and a recursive scheme for the prediction of state 
variables. The Appendix gives explicit solutions. The main differences are that policy rules 
depend on the covariance matrices of state disturbances and the recursive prediction scheme 
depends on the penalty matrices of the welfare loss criterion. This scheme yields inefficient 
and biased predictions of the state variables. The reader not interested in the mathematical 
details can quickly skip through section 2. Section 3 shows how prudence affects the optimal 
inflation-output trade-off, given that the central bank faces an expectations-augmented 
accelerationist Phillips curve and no measurement errors and lags. We show that the optimal 
nominal interest rate of a prudent central bank reacts more aggressively to the inflation gap, 
especially if cost-push disturbances are volatile. Section 4 derives a prudent Taylor rule if the 
real interest rate impacts aggregate demand after one period. We demonstrate that the optimal 
interest rate again responds more aggressively to the output gap if prudence and volatility of 
cost-push shocks are large and if there is substantial persistence in aggregate demand. We 
also show that more weight to output targeting weakens policy responses of the central bank, 
particularly if triggered by changes in the inflation gap. Section 5 allows for measurement 
errors and lags in observing output data. We show that the reactions of the nominal interest 
rate to the measured output gap are less strong, especially if incoming data are relatively 
unreliable. We also show that a prudent central bank attenuates these policy reactions and 
furthermore biases its estimate of the output gap upwards. This makes the reactions of the 
central bank to the output gap more aggressive, particularly if cost-push shocks are volatile 
and output targeting is important. Finally, we show that a prudent central bank introduces an 
extra upward (downward) bias in its estimate of the output gap to be fed into the policy rule if   4
inflation is above (below) target. The nominal interest rate reactions become more aggressive. 
Section 6 concludes and suggests area for further research. 
 
2. RISK-ADJUSTED LQG-CONTROL AND PREDICTION 
Jacobson (1973), Speyer, Deyst and Jacobson (1974), and Whittle (1981) extend the standard 
theory of optimal linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) control, discussed by Chow (1975) and 
others, for risk-sensitivity. Van der Ploeg (1984) discusses risk-sensitive LQG control with 
perfect observation of the states of the economy. Hansen and Sargent (1995) extend the 
analysis to allow for discounting. Van der Ploeg (1993) applied these ideas to the analysis of 
precautionary saving - see also Hansen, Sargent and Tallarani (1999). There is a brief mention 
of risk-sensitive control in the textbook of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000). 
We allow for imperfect observation of states of the economy and base our 
presentation on Whittle (1981). Consider the quadratic welfare loss criterion: 
 
(1)  Γ  ≡     γ
T
t 0 = Σ t    with    γt ≡ (xt – x*)′ Q (xt – x*) + (ut – u*)′ S (ut – u*),  0≤t<T 
and    γT  ≡  (xT – xT*)′ QT (xT – xT*), 
 
where the vectors xt and x* contain the actual and desired (or bliss) values for the state 
variables, the vectors ut and u* contain the actual and desired values for the policy 
instruments, and Q and S denote symmetric and positive-definite penalty matrices. It is easy 
to allow for cross products of xt and ut in the welfare loss function. The state variables follow 
from the state-space model: 
 
(2) xt  =  A xt-1  +  B ut-1  + at +  εt,    εt ∼ IN(0, Σ),   x0 ∼ N(xP0, V0), 
 
where A denotes the state-transition matrix, B stands for the matrix of policy impact 
multipliers and at is the vector of deterministic forcing terms. The error terms εt do not 
become known to the policy maker until period t, so he can only react to past realisations of 
state variables. Higher-order lag structures in state variables and in policy instruments and/or 
more general ARIMA-error structures can be dealt with by suitably augmenting the vector xt. 
The initial states may not be known perfectly. 
 Let  θ be the Arrow-Pratt measure of constant absolute risk aversion with respect to 
welfare -½Γ. The policy maker thus minimises the following criterion:   5
 
(3)  Φ(θ)   ≡   (2/θ) log E[exp(½ θ Γ)]    with    θ>0. 
 
The risk-neutral case corresponds to Φ(θ)→E[Γ] as θ→0. The policy maker minimises the 
expected risk-adjusted welfare loss to go. A prudent policy maker also penalises variability in 
welfare. For small θvar(Γ) the decision maker approximately minimises E(Γ)+¼θvar(Γ). Two 
policy makers may share the same welfare loss criterion under certainty, even though their 
aversion to risk may differ. The coefficient θ captures this specific risk aversion. It makes the 
policy maker particularly sensitive to occasional large deviations of Γ from E(Γ). Such a 
policy maker is called pessimistic, cautious or prudent. 
  With no observation lags and no measurement errors, the policy instruments ut can be 
conditioned on xt. Often not all the state variables are observable and other variables are 
measured imperfectly after a lag. We thus assume that the measured variables at time t are: 
 
(4) zt  =  C xt-1  +  ωt,    ωt ∼ IN(0,Ω), 
 
where ωt is the vector of serially uncorrelated, normally distributed measurement errors. We 
assume that modelling errors εt and measurement errors ωt are uncorrelated. The policies at 
time t react to measurements at time t, zt, of the imperfectly measured past states of the 
economy, xt-1. To allow for longer observation lags, suitably augment the vector of states. 
  It is useful to define the residual sum of squares (the quadratic function in the 
exponent of the joint density of state and measured variables) as: 
 
(5)  Δ ≡ (x0 – xP 0 ) ′ V0







xt + δzt ) 
with   δxt ≡ (xt+1 – A xt – B ut – at+1)′ Σ
-1 (xt+1 – A xt – B ut – at+1) 
and    δzt ≡ (zt+1 – C xt)′ Ω
-1 (zt+1 – C xt). 
 
We say that ‘stress’ occurs if states and policy instruments deviate from their desired values 
as measured by Γ. Total stress is then defined as: 
 
(6)  Ψ  ≡  Γ  -  Δ/θ. 
   6
With no uncertainty, total stress equals the quadratic welfare loss. With uncertainty in the 
state dynamics or in the measurement of the states, Δ>0 and total stress is reduced, 
particularly if the degree of prudence θ is small. 
 
Theorem 1 (Saddlepoint solution and stress):  
Suppose total stress (6), given (1) and (5), is freely minimised with respect to the instruments 
ut, ..,uT-1  and freely maximised with respect to the state variables x0, ..,xT and the measured 
variables zt+1, ..,zT conditional on all information available at time t, say It. The order in which 
these operations are carried out is irrelevant. The value of ut thus obtained is the optimal value 
of the vector of policy instruments at time t. The calculations only have meaning if θ is not 
too large, that is if total stress (6) is negative definite in the maximising variables. 
Proof: Whittle (1981, Chapter 19, Theorem 3.1). 
 
Standard certainty equivalence and separation hold for the risk-neutral case. The optimal 
instruments at time t, ut, can then be obtained by minimising the welfare cost to go Γ from 
time t onwards, where the unknown disturbances from time t+1 onwards are set to their 
expected values conditional on information available at time t, It. These expected values 
minimise the residual sum of squares Δ given It and yield BLUE-predictions of future states. 
With risk aversion the expected objective values for the disturbances at time t are 
replaced by prudent subjective values that maximise total stress Ψ given It. These prudent 
values are estimates of current observable variables that maximise stress. The values of 
ut+1,..,uT-1 in Theorem 1 are chosen to minimise stress; they are current estimates of optimal 
future decisions. The policy maker effectively plays a min-max non-cooperative game against 
nature. He treats nature as a belligerent player producing damaging shocks and designs a min-
max strategy for the ‘worst possible state of the world’. He hedges against unanticipated 
increases in the welfare loss caused by unfavourable shocks, particularly if prudence is large. 
To gain more insight, define past stress at time t as 
 
(7)  ΨPt(xt, It)  =   - θ
-1 (x0 – xP 0 ) ′ V0







s  - θ
-1 (δxs + δzs) ] 
 
and future stress at time t as 
   7
(8)  ΨFt(xt)  =        [ γ
11 1
Min Max Max







-1  (δxs + δzs) ]  +  γT 
=         ( γ
11
Min Max






-1 δxs )  +  γT . 
 
Expression (7) and (8) obey, respectively, a forward and a backward recursion: 
 
(7′)  ΨPt+1(xt+1, It+1)    =      
Max
t x
  [ ΨPt(xt, It)  +  γt  -  θ
-1 (δxt + δzt) ] 
with   ΨP0(x0, I0)  =  - θ
-1  (x0 – xP 0 ) ′ V0
-1 (x0 – xP 0 ) 
 





-1 δxt +  ΨFt+1(xt+1) ]  
with   ΨT(xT) =  γT = (xT – xT*)′ QT (xT – xT*). 
 
The forward recursion (7′) corresponds to a risk-adjusted Kalman filter. In contrast to the 
standard risk-neutral case, (7′) depends on preferences and gives prudent estimates of states of 
the economy as new information comes in. The backward recursion (8′) corresponds to the 
risk-adjusted Bellman equation and revises the current policy rule as the horizon recedes by a 
single period. In contrast to the risk-neutral case, the optimal policy rules depend on the 
covariance matrices of the modelling disturbances. Hence, uncertainty independence 
(certainty equivalence) of the optimal policy rules and preference indifference of the optimal 
state predictions no longer holds. Theorem 1 can be rephrased to show that a modified 
separation principle holds for risk-adjusted LQG control and prediction. 
 
Theorem 2 (Min-max solution and separation of control and prediction):  
Let u(xt, t) be the minimising value of ut in equation (8′) and let xMt be the value of xt that 
maximises ΨPt(xt, It)+ΨFt(xt), a function of It. Then the optimal value of ut is u(xMt, t), a 
function of It. 
 
With imperfect observation of states, the optimal instruments at time t depend on the 
maximum-stress estimate xMt. If states are perfectly observed, the optimal control rule is 
simply ut = u(xt, t). For many problems in economics it is more convenient to exploit the   8
explicit model structure and apply Theorem 2 directly. The Appendix gives the recursive 
solutions to the general problem of risk-adjusted LQG control and prediction. 
 
3. PRUDENCE AND THE OPTIMAL INFLATION-OUTPUT TRADE-OFF 
It is easy to apply the mathematics of risk-sensitive prediction and control exposited in 
section 2 to the derivation of optimal monetary policy. To illustrate prudence in the optimal 
inflation-output trade-off, consider the accelerationist Phillips-curve (e.g., Phelps, 1967): 
 
(9)  πt+1  =  πt  +  α yt  +  επ t+1    with    α > 0,   επ t  ∼ IN(0,σπ
2), 
 
where πt and yt denote the inflation rate and the output gap at time t, respectively, and επ t is a 
serially uncorrelated, normally distributed cost-push disturbance with zero mean and variance 
σπ
2. The long-run Phillips curve is vertical, so that systematic deviations from the natural rate 
of unemployment lead to an ever-ending spiral of inflation or deflation. 
The intra-temporal welfare loss function allows for flexible inflation targeting. It is 
given by γt = (πt-π*)
2 + κ yt
2, where π* indicates desired inflation (say, 2% per year) and κ>0 
is the weight given to full employment (output) targeting. Strict inflation targeting 
corresponds to κ=0. The equilibrium level of employment and output is efficient, so the 
desired output gap is zero. We thus abstract from extra inflation bias induced by time 
inconsistency problems as in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) and 
the consequent need for an ultraconservative central banker as in Rogoff (1985). The 
government can by appropriate use of fiscal and monetary policy immediately control the 
output gap, so yt is the intermediate policy instrument to attain price stability and full 
employment. Later we allow the nominal interest rate to be the monetary policy instrument. 
  Although the infinite-horizon limits of the prudent policy rules may be derived from 
Theorem A.2, it is instructive to apply Theorem 2 directly. The postulated cost-push 
disturbance and the optimal output gap at time t follow from the min-max problem: 
 
(10)  ΨF t(πt)   =       [(π
1
Max Min
t t y π ε +
t - π*)
2 + κ yt




If we postulate ΨFt(πt)=R(πt-π*)
2, the postulated ‘worst case’ inflation shock is given by: 
  
(11)  εM π t+1  =  θ σπ
2 RA  (πt  +  α yt - π*)    with    RA ≡ R/(1 - θ σπ
2 R) ≥ R > 0,   9
 
where θσπ
2R<1 must hold for (11) to be a maximum. R and RA indicate the infinite-horizon 
limits of Rt and RAt. A prudent central bank assumes the ‘worst’ by postulating that cost-push 
disturbances hit the economy adversely even though expected values of these shocks are zero. 
When the objective expectation of future inflation, πt+1⏐t ≡ E(πt+1 given It), is above (below) 
target, the central bank biases its subjective estimate of future inflation, (πt+1⏐t+εMπ t+1), 
upwards (downwards), particularly so if prudence is important and the volatility of cost-push 
shocks is large. The optimal value of the output gap is: 
 
(12) yt  =  - η (πt -π*)    with    η ≡ α R/[κ + (α
2 - θ σπ
2 κ)  R] > 0, 
 
so that the central bank depresses aggregate demand if inflation is above target. Upon 
substitution of (11) and (12) into (10) and equating coefficients on πt
2, we obtain the quadratic 
(α
2 - θ σπ
2 κ) (R
2 - R) - κ = 0. The positive root yields the relevant value of R:
1
 
(13)  R  =  ½ + ½ [1 + 4 κ (α
2 - θ σπ
2 κ)
-1]
½  ≥  1. 
 
With strict inflation targeting (κ=0), we have R=1 and η=1/α. Output is adjusted to achieve 
target inflation without any systematic error. Inflation is thus, apart from white noise, equal to 
desired inflation, πt=π*+επ t, regardless if there is prudent behaviour or not. Hence, with strict 
inflation targeting the postulated 'worst case' inflation shock is zero. 
  With flexible inflation targeting (κ>0), the postulated closed-loop dynamics for the 
inflation rate is given by: 
 
(14)  πM t+1 - π* = AP (πt - π*)   with   0 < AP ≡ κ/[κ+(α
2 -θσπ
2κ)R] < 1. 
 
The minimisation of criterion (3) or (6) only converges and makes sense if AP<1 and R>1, so 
θσπ
2<α
2/κ. In fact, this inequality holds automatically if the second-order condition for the 
prevention of breakdown, i.e., RA > 0 and thus θσπ




The actual closed-loop dynamics for the inflation rate is then stable as well: 
 
(15)  πt+1 - π* = AC πt + επ t+1   with   0 < AC ≡ 1-αη = κ(1-θ σπ
2 R)/[κ+(α
2 -θσπ
2κ)R] < 1.   10
 
The reaction coefficient is positive and smaller than with strict inflation targeting, i.e., 
0<η<1/α, so that the central bank plays safe and offsets systematic shocks less than fully. 
Monetary policy 'leans against the wind', because the central bank responds to excess inflation 
by deflating the economy (e.g., by raising the nominal interest rate). Since both R and RA are 
increasing functions of θσπ
2, the reaction coefficient η is an increasing function of θσπ
2. 
Hence, the policy reactions are particularly severe if the central bank is very prudent and cost-
push shocks are highly unpredictable. 
Prudence raises the effective shadow penalty on inflation (RA > R). A prudent central 
bank suffers a greater loss in utility from an unexpected rise in inflation than it gains from an 
unexpected fall in inflation of equal magnitude. The central bank thus puts more effort into 
cutting inflation to counteract possible stagflationary shocks. Hence, as prudence θ increases, 
the shadow penalty on inflation RA rises and the reaction coefficient η rises. 
It can be shown that the adjustment speed for the actual closed-loop economy 
declines with the degree of prudence and the volatility of cost-push shocks (∂AC/∂θσπ
2<0). In 
contrast, the adjustment speed for the postulated closed-loop economy rises with prudence 
and volatility (∂AP/∂θσπ
2>0). A very prudent government reacts ‘nervously’ and is controlling 
the economy very precisely. We assume that the degree of prudence is not too large in order 
to avoid breakdown. This occurs as θσπ
2R→1, that is as θσπ
2→α
2/(α
2+κ). In that case, it can 
be shown that R→1+(κ/α
2), RA→∞, η→α
-1 and πt → επ t. For too high degrees of prudence 
the central bank has become too neurotic, since it is unable to offset the shocks that it fears 
and the risk-adjusted policy rule breaks down. The central bank's pessimistic assessment of 
shocks to the inflation rate so outweighs its knowledge of its statistical distribution that his 
expected cost criterion becomes infinite. Hence, optimisation becomes pointless and the 
central bank suffers a breakdown. As prudence increases and breakdown is approached, the 
central bank raises the reaction coefficient to the level that corresponds to strict inflation 
targeting (η→1/α). In this sense, prudent central bankers attach greater weight to inflation 
than to output targeting. It is a very different rationale for a conservative central bank than the 
credibility argument provided by Rogoff (1985). 
  The output rule (12) can be implemented as a monetary policy rule. Let the output 
gap depend on the current real interest rate and ignore shocks to aggregate demand: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 The economy is controllable (if β≠0) and the penalty matrix Q is positive definite (if κ≠0), so the 
Riccatti equation converges (see Appendix). A steady-state Riccatti coefficient R thus exists.   11
(16)  yt  =  -  β ( it - πt+1⏐t  - r)  =  -  β ( it - πt - α yt - r)  =  - β′ ( it - πt - r) 
with  β′ ≡ β/(1-αβ) > β > 0, 
 
where it is the (short) nominal interest rate at time t and r indicates the average Wicksellian 
real interest rate. Stability of the IS-curve requires αβ<1, so β′>β>0. The one-period-ahead 
rational-expectations private-sector forecast of inflation equals πt+1⏐t  = πt + α yt, so the real 
interest rate is given by it - πt+1⏐t = it - πt - αyt. Substitution of (16) into the Phillips curve (9) 
yields πt+1 = (1+αβ′)πt - αβ′( it-r) + επ t+1, so the uncontrolled inflation dynamics is unstable. 
The output rule (12) gives the following reaction function for the nominal interest rate: 
 
(17) it  =  r + π* + [1 + (η/β′)] (πt - π*) 
 
so if inflation is above target the central bank tightens monetary policy. This interest rate rule 
can also be expressed as it = r+π*-(η
-1+β′
-1)yt . But then the central bank depresses the 
economy in periods of unemployment by raising the nominal interest rate. This is obviously 
unrealistic. Section 4 allows for a richer structure of the economy, so that the optimal interest 
rule corresponds to a Taylor rule that reacts to both the inflation gap and the output gap. 
We conclude that the constant in the nominal interest rate rule equals the sum of the 
average real interest rate and desired inflation and that the reaction coefficient for the inflation 
gap exceeds unity. We also observe that policy reactions are more aggressive if the central 
bank is prudent and cost-push shocks are volatile. Sargent (1999) derives a similar result in a 
different context. If the degree of prudence increases, the central bank tends towards strict 
inflation targeting and pushes up the reaction coefficient on the inflation gap towards 1/αβ>1. 
Equations (12) and (13) show that ∂η/∂κ=-(1-θσπ
2)<0 if κ=0, hence introducing output 
targeting (κ>0) raises R, but reduces η. Hence, if the central bank attaches more weight to 
output targeting (higher κ), rule (17) indicates that the interest rate responds more vigorously 
to changes in the inflation gap. 
 
Proposition 1: If inflation follows an accelerationist Phillips curve and the real interest rate 
impacts aggregate demand instantaneously, the optimal nominal interest rate is given by the 
sum of the average real interest rate and desired inflation plus a term that reacts to the 
inflation gap. The nominal interest rate reacts more strongly to the inflation gap if output 
targeting is important. A prudent central bank assigns less power to the nominal interest rate   12
and thus reacts more aggressively to the inflation gap, particularly so if the volatility of cost-
push shocks is large. More prudent behaviour leads in the limit to strict inflation targeting. 
 
4. CAUTIOUS TAYLOR RULES WITH PERFECT OBSERVATION 
Section 3 demonstrated the effects of prudence on the optimal inflation-output trade-off. To 
gain a better understanding of prudent monetary policy, we analyse how caution affects 
optimal Taylor rules (Taylor, 1993). For a discussion of the forward-looking New Keynesian 
Phillips curve based on Calvo (1983), πt = δπt+1 + αyt + επ t+1 with δ≤1, see Roberts (1995), 
Clarida, Gáli and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003). However, Mankiw and Reiss (2002) 
criticise this literature. Its predictions that disinflation causes a boom and that monetary 
policy quickly impacts inflation are patently unrealistic. Instead, they suggest that sluggish 
price adjustment may occur if information disseminates slowly throughout the population. 
Optimal monetary policy is then described by an elastic price standard in which there is no 
base drift in the price level and the price level deviates from target if output deviates from the 
natural rate (Ball, Mankiw and Reiss, 2003). Christiano et al. (2003) obtain inflation inertia as 
well by assuming that the aggregate price index becomes available with a lag and replacing 
the New Keynesian Phillips curve by πt -γπt-1 = δ(πt+1 - γπt)+ αyt + επ t+1 with 0≤γ≤1. Since 
these issues are still debated, we show the effects of prudence with the familiar backward-
looking Phillips curve. In fact, we use the backward-looking model of a closed economy 
developed by Svensson (1997). Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) show that this model seems 
to fit US data fairly well; see also Judd and Rudebusch (1998). 
We use the accelerationist Phillips curve (9) and allow for output persistence and 
stochastic shocks to aggregate demand. The nominal interest rate affects output with a lag of 
one period and inflation with a lag of two periods. Aggregate demand is thus given by: 
 
(16′) yt+1  =  λ yt  -  β ( it - πt+1⏐t  - r)  +  εy t+1  =  λ yt  -  β ( it - πt - α yt - r)  +  εy t+1
=  λ′ yt  -  β ( it - πt - r)  +  εy t+1    
with   0<λ<1,   λ′≡λ+αβ>λ,   β>0    and   εy t ∼ IN(0, σy
2), 
 
where λ indicates persistence in the output gap and εyt is a serially uncorrelated, normally 
distributed demand shock with zero mean and variance σy
2. The one-period-ahead private-
sector inflation forecast and the real interest rate are given by, respectively, πt+1⏐t  = πt + αyt 
and it - πt+1⏐t = it - πt - αyt. The state variables are πt and yt. The instrument is the (short)   13
nominal interest rate it. Each period corresponds roughly to three quarters. We postpone the 
treatment of lags and errors in measuring the output gap to section 5.  
We use Theorem 2 (or alternatively Theorem A.1) to derive prudent policy rules for 
the optimal nominal interest rate as a function of last period’s inflation gap and output gaps. 
These policy rules introduce caution into the well-known Taylor rules for monetary policy. 
Postulating that future stress is given by ΨFt(πt ,yt) = Rππ(πt-π*)
2 +Ryyyt
2+2Rπy(πt-π*)yt and 
solving the min-max problem (8′) with respect to next period's disturbances and considering 
the infinite-horizon limits, we obtain εMy t+1=0 and 
 
(17)  εMπ t+1  =  θ σπ
2 ξ1 [1 - θσπ
2 ξ1]
-1 (πt + α yt - π*)   with   ξ1 ≡ Rππ-Rπy
2/Ryy > 0, 
 
where we require 0≤θσπ
2ξ1<1 for a meaningful solution. Since the matrix R must be positive 
definite, the coefficient ξ1 is positive. The central bank sets the value of the future aggregate 
demand disturbance equal to its expected value. In contrast, the central bank postulates that 
the value of the cost-push shock exceeds its expected value if the one-period-ahead inflation 
forecast is above target. A prudent central bank thus assumes that cost-push shocks hurt 
objectives more than their statistical expectation suggests they would.  
The min-max problem (8′) also yields the prudent Taylor rule: 
 
(18)  it  = r + π* + (1 + μπ) (πt - π*) + μy yt     
with   μπ ≡ ξ2 [β(1-θσπ
2 ξ1)]
-1 > 0,  μy ≡ (λ′/β)+αμπ > 0  and  ξ2 ≡ Rπy/Ryy > 0. 
 
Substitution of (17) and (18) together with (9) and (16′) into the recursion (8′) and equating 
coefficients on πt
2, yt
2 and πtyt, we obtain the algebraic equations: 
 
(19)  ξ1 = Rππ - [α
2 (Rππ - 1)
2]/[κ + α
2 (Rππ - 1)] > 0 
Rππ = 1 + ξ1 (1-θσπ
2 ξ1)
-2 > 1  and   0 < ξ2 = α/[α
2 + κ/(Rππ – 1)] < 1/α. 
 
The first two equations of (19) can be solved simultaneously for Rππ and ξ1 and subsequently 
the third equation of (19) gives ξ2. The reaction coefficients then follow from (18). Note that 
Rπy=α(Rππ-1)>0 and Ryy=κ+α
2(Rππ-1)>0. 
The constant in the prudent Taylor rule corresponds to the sum of the average real 
interest rate and target inflation. The optimal nominal interest rate ‘leans against the wind’,   14
since the central bank deflates (reflates) the economy by raising (lowering) the nominal 
interest rate if inflation and output are above (below) target. The central bank reacts more 
vigorously to the output gap if there is a relatively large degree of persistence in aggregate 
demand. The private-sector one-period-ahead inflation forecast, πt+1⏐t = πt + αyt, is 
predetermined in period t and independent of the instrument it. Hence, we can rewrite the 
prudent Taylor rule (18) so that the nominal interest reacts to the one-period-ahead inflation 
gap forecast and the output gap:  
 
(18′) it  = r + π* + (1 + μπ) (πt+1|t - π*) + (λ/β) yt. 
 
The reaction coefficient with respect to the one-period-ahead inflation forecast also exceeds 
unity if there is prudence; cf., Woodford (2001) for the case without prudence. Clarida, Gáli 
and Gertler (2000) and Svensson and Woodford (2002) discuss the merits of the nominal 
interest rate reacting to future forecasts of inflation and the output gap if there is no prudence. 
To better understand the prudent Taylor rule (18), we consider some special cases. If 
there is no prudence or there are no cost-push disturbances (θσπ
2=0), we have: 
 
(18′)  μπ = αξ1 /[β(κ+α
2ξ1)] < 1/αβ   and   ξ1 = ½ + ½ (1 + 4κ/α
2)
½ ≥ 1. 
 
Flexible inflation targeting without prudence gives the well-known Taylor (1993) rule, which 
was estimated as it = 4%+1.5 (πt-π*)+0.5 yt. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999) provide 
other estimates of Taylor rules. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Woodford (2001) argue 
that the optimal output-response coefficient is much smaller if de-trended output is used 
instead of the theoretically correct output gap measure. The special case of strict inflation 
targeting and no prudence yields ξ1=1 and the reaction coefficients μπ=1/αβ, μy=(1+λ′)/β. It 
gives the maximum reaction to the inflation and output gaps. More emphasis on output 
targeting (higher κ) reduces both reaction coefficients. 
If we allow for prudence in the face of cost-push shocks (θσπ
2>0), strict inflation 
targeting (κ=0) implies ξ1=1, ξ2=1/α, μπ=1/[αβ(1-θσπ
2)]>1/(αβ) and μy>(1+λ′)/β. In contrast 
to the case where the real interest rate affects aggregate demand instantaneously (see section 
3), prudence and volatile cost-push disturbances imply more aggressive reactions to changes 
in the inflation and output gaps with strict inflation targeting. 
A case of special interest is what happens just before the degree of prudence or 
volatility of cost-push shocks reaches breakdown-level. This occurs as θσπ
2→1 and thus as   15
ξ1→1, ξ2→1/α and μπ, μy→∞. The policy makers have become so neurotic and their policy 
reactions so aggressive that optimisation becomes pointless. In fact, the central bank’s 
subjective assessment of cost-push shocks has become so pessimistic that it outweighs its 
objective knowledge of its statistical distribution. Hence, the expected cost criterion becomes 
infinite and the central bank's policy rule breaks down. 
For the general case of flexible inflation targeting (κ>0) and prudence with stochastic 
cost-push shocks (θσπ
2>0), total differentiation of (19) shows that Rππ,  ξ1 and ξ2 are 
increasing functions of θσπ
2 and thus that the reaction coefficients μπ and μy are increasing 
function of θσπ
2. Hence, the nominal interest rate reacts more aggressively to inflation and 
output gaps if the central bank is more prudent and cost-push disturbances are more volatile. 
If aggregate demand is not much affected by the real interest rate (small β), the policy 
reactions are more aggressive as well. More weight to output targeting (higher κ) raises both 
Rππ and ξ1 and, typically, reduces ξ2 . Hence, the nominal interest rate rule becomes less 
aggressive (μπ and μy fall) but less so for a prudent central bank. More weight to output 
targeting thus attenuates the central bank's policy reactions to changes in the output gap and, 
especially, the inflation gap.  
 
Proposition 2: If the nominal interest rate impacts output after one period and inflation after 
two periods, the optimal nominal interest rate also reacts to the output gap, especially if there 
is substantial persistence in aggregate demand. The central bank reacts more vigorously to 
both the inflation gap and the output gap if prudence is important and the volatility of shocks 
to the dynamics of inflation is large, even under strict inflation targeting. More weight to 
output targeting weakens policy responses of the central bank, particularly if caused by 
changes in the inflation gap. Volatility of shocks to aggregate demand does not affect the 
monetary policy rules. 
 
5.  PRUDENT TAYLOR RULES WITH MEASUREMENT LAGS AND ERRORS 
In practice central bankers conduct monetary policy in an environment in which they observe 
the inflation rate pretty well, but measure the output gap with a lag and imperfectly. We thus 
assume that the central bank observes the inflation rate instantaneously and without error 
while it observes the output gap with a lag of one period and measurement error ωy t: 
 
(20) zt  =  yt-1  +  ωy t,     ωy t  ∼ IN(0,τ
 2),   y0 ∼ N(yP0, vy0), 
   16
where ωyt is the serially uncorrelated, normally distributed measurement error with zero mean 
and variance τ
2. The optimal nominal interest rate rule thus reacts to the imperfectly measured 
output gap of the previous period and this period’s realised inflation rate. With the aid of 
Theorem 2 a prudent central bank can still separate the problems of control and prediction. 
First, it solves the min-max problem (8′) to find the nominal interest rate rule (18). Then, it 
solves for the prediction of the output gap yMt to be used in the prudent Taylor rule, 
 
(18″)  it  = r + π* + (1 + μπ) (πt - π*) + μy yMt,     
 
by maximising total past and future stress ΨPt(yt,It)+ΨFt(πt,yt). Past stress depends on only one 
stochastic variable, i.e., the unknown output gap and not the perfectly and instantaneously 
observable inflation rate. We thus postulate that past stress equals ΨPt(yt,It)≡-(θvyt)
-1(yt–yP t)
2. 
Maximising total stress with respect to the current output gap yields: 
 
(21) yMt  =  [yPt + θ vyt Rπ y (πt-π*)]/[1 - θ vyt Ryy]. 
 
A risk-neutral central bank uses the output gap predictions coming from the conventional 
Kalman filter, yPt. A prudent central bank, however, biases its measurement of the output gap 
predictions upwards (downwards) if inflation is above (below) target. To fight too high (low) 
inflation, the central bank tightens (loosens) monetary policy by raising (lowering) the 
nominal interest rate. Consequently, the bias in the output gap reinforces this nominal interest 
rate response, especially if the variance of the measurement error in the output gap is large 
and prudence is important. In fact, even if inflation is on target, the central bank amplifies the 
objective estimate of the output gap and thus effectively reacts more aggressively to 
deviations of the statistical Kalman filter estimate of the output gap from target. 
The final step is to derive the risk-adjusted updating predictions for the output gap 
and their variances, yPt and vyt, from the recursions: 
 











with  ΨP0(y0,I0)  ≡  - (θvy0)
-1  (y0–yP 0 )
2. 
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Solving for the maximising value of yt, substituting back into the recursion (22), and equating 
coefficients on yt+1
2 and yt+1 yields the following risk-adjusted updating formulae for the mean 
and variance of the output gap: 
 




-2 - θ κ)
-1
 




-2 (zt+1 – yPt) + θ κ yPt], 
 
where prudence must be small for a meaningful solution (i.e., θ<(κvyt)
-1, ∀t>0 must hold). 
The infinite-horizon limit of the variance of the output gap, vy, solves the quadratic: 
 
(23′) (τ
-2 - θκ) vy
2 – [λ′
2 + (τ
-2 - θκ) σy
2 – 1] vy - σy
2 = 0. 
 
It follows from total differentiation of (23′) that the asymptotic variance of the output gap (vy) 
is large if the measurements of the output gap are unreliable (τ
2 large), the shocks hitting 
aggregate demand are volatile (σy
2 large), and persistence in aggregate demand is substantial 
(λ′ large). In addition, as a precautionary measure, a prudent central bank pushes up its 
subjective estimate of the variance of the output gap, especially if output targeting is 
important. This helps to avoid costly mistakes. 
  If there is no prudence, (24) gives the standard Bayesian updating formula for the 
BLUE-predictions of the imperfectly measured output gaps. New measurements of the output 
gap thus induce less substantial revisions if the signal-to-noise ratio is large, that is if new 
data are unreliable relative to the precision of the current estimate of the output gap (i.e., τ
2/vyt 
large). The reactions of the central bank to the measured output gap are thus weakened, 
particularly if incoming data are unreliable. A prudent central bank committed to strict 
inflation targeting (κ=0) uses these predictions of the output gap in the decoupling formulae 
(21) and subsequently in the prudent Taylor rule (18). A prudent central bank with no concern 
for output targeting thus simply biases the output gap predictions upwards (downwards) if 
inflation is above (below) target. 
If the central bank is prudent and engages in flexible inflation targeting, equation (24) 
requires two adjustments to the predictions. First, the magnitude of the revisions of the output 
gap are increased if prudence and output targeting are important (θκ large). Note that there is 
a direct effect of θκ on the term multiplying zt+1-ypt in (24) and an indirect effect through vyt. 
A prudent central bank weakens its response to changes in the output gap rather less if it   18
attaches a large weight to output targeting. Essentially, a prudent central bank makes more 
use of faulty data rather than risking the chance of big stochastic fluctuations in the output 
gap and thus adopts a more aggressive policy response. Second, a prudent central bank 
introduces as a precautionary measure an upward bias in its estimate of the output gap, 
especially if the weight given to output targeting is large. The resulting upward bias in the 
nominal interest rate depresses the economy, so that the central bank is cushioned against 
unexpected large positive output gaps. Clearly, the predictions that follow from (23) and (24) 
are neither efficient nor unbiased. 
 
Proposition 3: If inflation is observed instantaneously and without error but the output gap is 
imperfectly observed with a period of one lag, the nominal interest rate reacts less strongly to 
the imperfectly measured output gap. The reaction is particularly weakened if the variance of 
the measurement error is large relative to the variance of the current estimate of the output 
gap, where the latter increases with the variance of the shocks to and the degree of persistence 
in aggregate demand. However, if prudence is important and the welfare weight given to 
unemployment is large, the central bank employs as a precautionary measure a larger variance 
of the output gap and attenuates its reactions to changes in the output gap rather less. 
Furthermore, a prudent central bank introduces as precaution an upward bias in its estimate of 
the output gap and thus in the nominal interest rate, especially if output targeting is important. 
Finally, a prudent central bank introduces an extra upward (downward) bias in its estimate of 
the output gap before it feeds into the policy rule if inflation is above (below) target. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have introduced prudence into the standard LQG control and prediction framework. A 
prudent policy maker increases the shadow penalty on target variables, since he wants to 
hedge against stochastic shocks possibly hampering the achievement of desired values. This 
invalidates usual certainty equivalence, so that one cannot substitute future disturbances by 
their expected values. Instead, a prudent policy maker uses subjective, cautious estimates of 
future disturbances that depend on preferences in order to avoid costly mistakes. 
In practice a policy maker faces errors and lags in observing the state of the world. A 
risk-neutral policy maker uses the Kalman filter to revise BLUE-estimates of the mean and 
covariance matrix of the states of the world as new information comes in. These predictions 
are independent of preferences and are used in the optimal feedback policy rules. A prudent 
policy maker uses inefficient predictions of the states of the world, since he raises the 
variances of the states versus those of the incoming observations as he is afraid to incorporate   19
possibly faulty information that may lead to significant welfare losses. Large penalties for the 
target variables and a high degree of prudence imply large reductions in the relative precision 
of the measurements. A prudent policy maker also introduces a bias in the prediction of the 
states. Hence, the prudent Kalman filter no longer yields BLUE-predictions of the states. 
With prudence special care must be taken to couple the derivation of the optimal control rules 
and the prediction of the states. 
  Since prudence is the essence of central banking, we investigated the effects of 
prudence on optimal monetary policy rules. In line with Sargent (1999), we found that 
allowing for prudence on the optimal inflation-output trade-off yields more aggressive 
reactions of the nominal interest rates to the inflation gap, particularly if the volatility of cost-
push shocks is great. Craine (1979) and Söderström (2002) allow for parameter uncertainty in 
the dynamics of inflation and also find more vigorous policy responses. To be safe a prudent 
central bank assigns a lower effectiveness of its monetary instrument. More prudent 
behaviour is in the limit equivalent to strict inflation targeting. If the real interest rate affects 
aggregate demand with a lag, the nominal interest rate also reacts to the output gap, especially 
if there is substantial persistence in aggregate demand. Prudence and bigger volatility of cost-
push disturbances imply stronger reactions to both the inflation and output gaps, even under 
strict inflation targeting. More weight to output targeting weakens policy responses of the 
central bank, particularly if caused by changes in the inflation gap. 
Rudebush (2001) shows that data uncertainty in the model of Rudebusch and 
Svensson (1999) leads to weaker monetary policy reactions. We also find that the reactions of 
the nominal interest rate to the measured output gap are less strong, especially if the incoming 
outgap data are relatively unreliable compared with the precision of the current output gap 
estimate. However, a prudent central bank attenuates its reactions to changes in the output gap 
much less, especially if output targeting is important. A prudent central bank also introduces 
as a precautionary measure an upward bias in its estimate of the output gap and thus in the 
nominal interest rate, again especially if output targeting is important. Both these elements 
make the reactions of the central bank to the output gap more aggressive, particularly if 
shocks to inflation are volatile and output targeting is important. Finally, a prudent central 
bank introduces an extra upward (downward) bias in its estimate of the output gap before it 
feeds into the policy rule if inflation is above (below) target. This makes the nominal interest 
rate reactions more aggressive. 
  It is important to extend our methods for deriving prudent policy rules and prediction 
formulae to macroeconomic models with forward-looking expectations. This is crucial for a 
deeper understanding of monetary policy. However, the forward-looking New Keynesian   20
Phillips curve reviewed in Clarida, Gáli and Gertler (1999) seems unrealistic, since it predicts 
that disinflation causes a boom and monetary policy impacts inflation quickly. Christiano et 
al. (2001) assume that individual prices are indexed to an aggregate price index and that the 
latter becomes available for indexation only after a lag. This modification gives rise to 
inflation inertia. Ball, Mankiw and Reiss (2003) assume that information disseminates slowly 
throughout the population and obtain more realistic impulse responses as well. They find that 
an elastic price standard is optimal. It is worthwhile to investigate how Taylor rules are 
affected by prudence in these more realistic models. It also seems worthwhile to investigate 
how prudence affects optimal fiscal and monetary policy when prices are sticky and 
government debt is used to smooth tax distortions. It may thus be interesting to introduce 
prudence in the analysis of Benigno and Woodford (2003). It seems realistic to suppose 
asymmetry, i.e., that the central bank is more prudent than the fiscal authority. 
In future research, it is worthwhile to explore how other types of model uncertainty 
(e.g., multiplicative disturbances, uncertainty about model specification) affect prudent 
behaviour. For example, parameters such as the sensitivity of unanticipated inflation with 
respect to the output gap and the interest rate semi-elasticity of aggregate demand may not be 
known precisely. Brainard (1967) shows that it then pays to use more instruments than targets 
and, in particular, to use a mix of instruments in order to diversify risks and to not go the 
whole hog in reaching desired values – see also, e.g., Söderström (2002). An interesting 
question is how a prudent central banker adjusts its behaviour in response to multiplicative 
uncertainty about key parameters. 
A related issue is robustness of policy rules - e.g., Onatski and Stock (2000), 
Giannoni and Woodford (2002, 2003), and Onatski and Williams (2003). Such rules should 
be simple, easy to understand, react to measured variables, stabilise the economy, and be 
determinate in the sense of supporting a rational expectations equilibrium. Robust rules 
should do well under a wide variety of assumptions about the precise statistical distribution 
and order of the additive disturbance processes affecting the economy and the processes 
driving the measurement errors. This amounts to a different type of prudence to that discussed 
here. It requires both robust Baysesian and min-max policy rules that do well under the 'worst' 
possible predictions. Central banks do not react very strongly to something that is likely to be 
estimated with considerable error, but prudence makes the reactions to poor data more 
aggressive. Onatski and Williams (2003) also find that many of their robust policy rules are 
relatively aggressive, since central banks fear particularly very persistent increases in inflation 
arising from long-run deviations from a vertical Phillips curve. Such rules perform well at low 
frequencies, but consequently fare worse at business cycle frequencies. In general, robustness   21
requires the central bank to react to a richer lag structure of output gaps and inflation rate and, 
perhaps, even to other indicators of monetary imbalance. 
Svensson (2002) and Feldstein (2003) rightly argue that a prudent central bank will 
reserve the right to use informal judgement in addition to a formal policy rule. This allows for 
the use of other and more subjective information and for effects not captured by the formal 
model and rule. In addition, it may enhance its credibility. A prudent central bank does not 
mechanically apply a Taylor-type rule, but may use it as a rule of thumb for monetary policy. 
A useful area for further research is thus to develop a framework of prudent monetary policy 
formulation in which there is scope for judgement of central bankers. Svensson (2002) 
suggests a framework for doing just that, but the prudent Kalman filter predictions discussed 
here also provide a natural way of incorporating judgement of central bankers into more 
formal Taylor-type rules for the nominal interest rate. 
To conclude it may be useful to qualify our results in two important respects. 
Common sense of many practitioners dictates that prudence implies that the nominal interest 
rate should respond less strongly to changes in inflation and output gaps, while our analysis 
suggests more aggressive policy responses. There is no reason why prudence should imply 
passive behaviour of the policy maker. In fact, it is more likely to lead to overzealous, even 
uptight control of the economy. Just as a prudent driver may react strongly to every bend in 
the road in order to avoid driving into the curb, a prudent central bank changes the interest 
rate more frequently. Practitioners may be more concerned with nominal interest rate 
smoothing than output targeting - e.g., Lippi and Neri (2003). However, it helps to offer some 
kind of welfare-theoretic rationale and explain why interest rate volatility may damage 
welfare and financial markets - e.g., Woodford (2002). Perhaps, central bankers delay interest 
rate adjustments and prefer some unpredictability in order not to be seen to follow the 
pressure of market players and commentators. The second qualification is that neither the 
traditional nor the New Keynesian Phillips curves fully capture real world features such as 
credit constraints, equity constraints, bankruptcies and other market failures arising from 
imperfect information. Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) point out that then the nominal interest 
rate affects aggregate demand and that monetary policy is associated with big allocative 
distortions and is as much about supervision and regulation as the interest rate. 
 
APPENDIX: RECURSIVE SOLUTIONS 
First, we present a theorem with the optimal risk-adjusted feedback policy rules for the case 
that states are perfectly observable without measurement lags and that instruments do not   22
enter the intra-temporal welfare loss function (S=0). Subsequently, we present the recursive 
solution if state variables are not or imperfectly observable with a one-period lag. 
 
Theorem A.1 (Risk-adjusted LQG control with perfect state observation):  
Minimisation of the risk-adjusted welfare loss criterion (3) subject to the welfare loss (1) with 
S=0 and the state-space model (2) yields the following optimal policy feedback rules: 
 
(A1) ut  =  Gt+1  xt  +  gt+1, 
 
where the feedback gain matrix and the vector of policy constants are given by 
 
(A2) Gt ≡ - (B′RAtB)
-1 B′RAt A   and   gt ≡ - (B′RAtB)
-1 B′RAt (at - rt) 
with   RAt ≡ (Rt
-1 - θ Σ)
-1 
 
and the Riccatti and auxiliary equations are given by 
 
(A3) Rt = Q + (A+BGt+1)′ RA t+1 (A+BGt+1) and Rt rt = Q x* + (A+BGt+1)′ RA t+1 (rt+1 – at+1) 
starting with  RT = QT  and  rT = xT*, 
 
where Rt and RAt denote symmetric and positive-definite Riccatti matrices. The postulated 
min-max value of the vector of disturbances at time t is given by 
 
(A4)  εP t   =  θ Σ RAt (A xt-1 + B ut-1 + at – rt). 
 
The matrix (I - θ Σ Rt) must be positive definite for all t. Otherwise, there will be an infinite 
expected loss of utility. The more general case of non-zero S is treated in Theorem A.2. 
Proof: Use the Bellman principle of dynamic programming – see van der Ploeg (1984). 
 
The risk-neutral case (θ=0) does not depend on the covariance matrix Σ and corresponds 
exactly to Chow (1975, Chapters 7 and 8). The principle of certainty equivalence no longer 
applies exactly if θ≠0, since the optimal policy feedback rules (A1)-(A3) can no longer be 
obtained by simply setting the disturbance terms at their expected values (i.e. εt =0). The risk-
averse policy rules depend on the covariance matrix Σ, since in each period the policy maker 
replaces the (symmetric) shadow penalty matrix Rt by the risk-adjusted shadow penalty   23
matrix RAt. A risk-averse policy maker thus increases the effective shadow penalty on 
uncertain target variables. The policy maker wants to be safe and avoid shocks frustrating the 
achievement of desired targets. The size of the increase in the risk-adjusted shadow penalty 
increases with the variance of the target variable. The prudent policy maker when deciding on 
the instruments for this period does not set next period’s disturbances to their expected value 
of zero, but instead sets them equal to (A4). 
 
Theorem A.2 (Risk-adjusted LQG control and prediction - homogenous case): 
Consider the homogenous case with at=x*=0 and u*=0. Assume that the matrix [Rs–(θΣ)
-1] is  
negative definite for s>t. Future stress is quadratic in the states, i.e., ΨF t(xt) = xt′ Rt xt, where 
the symmetric and positive-definite matrix R obeys the risk-adjusted Riccatti recursion: 
 
(A5) Rt  =  Q + A′ (BS
-1B′ - θ Σ + Rt+1
-1)
-1 A   with   RT = QT . 
 
The optimal control is linear in xMt, the maximum-stress estimate, or xPt, the predicted states: 
 
(A6) u(xPt , t) = Gt xM t  with  xM t ≡ (I-θΣRt)






Past stress equals (up to a constant) ΨPt(xt, It ) = - θ
-1 (xt – xPt)′ Vt
-1 (xt – xPt) where the matrix 
Vt and the predicted states xPt satisfy the prudent Kalman filter recursions provided that the 
matrix [Vs – (θ Q)
-1] is negative definite for s≤t.: 
 
(A7) Vt  =  Σ + A (Vt-1
-1 + C′Ω
-1C - θ Q)
-1 A′,   t≥1 
 
(A8) xPt  =  A xPt-1 + B ut-1 + 
A (Vt-1
-1 + C′Ω
-1C - θ Q)
-1 [C′Ω
-1 (zt+1 – C xPt) + θ Q xP t],   t≥1. 
 
If there are no measurement errors or lags in observation, (A6) becomes u(xt ,t) = Gt xt. 
Proof: Application of Theorem 2; see Whittle (1981, Chapter 19). 
 
A prudent policy maker has the pessimistic view that state disturbances push the states in an 
undesired direction. Hence, the policy maker reduces the effective power of its instruments 
(BS
-1B′) in (A5)-(A6) by (θΣ). The extent by which it reduces the power of its instruments is 
thus large if prudence θ is big and shocks are volatile. A prudent policy maker also has a   24
pessimistic view on the use of new information and thus reduces the observation information 
matrix (C′Ω
-1C) in (A7)-(A8) by θQ. Use of new information is particularly discounted if 
prudence θ is big and the state penalties are large. In the case of no prudence, θ=0, the 
Kalman filter gives xPt as the Bayesian estimate of the states, E[xt⏐It), and Vt is its covariance 
matrix. With prudence xPt takes account of the ‘worst state of the world’ and thus maximises 
past stress. The term (θQxPt) in the prudent Kalman filter (A8) is the bias of incoming 
information due to prudence of the policy maker. Hence, the prudent Kalman filter (A7)-(A8) 
not only produces inefficient estimates, due to the reduction of the observation information 
matrix by θQ, but it also produces biased estimates. 
  The stationary infinite-horizon limit of Rt as t→∞, R, exists if, say, the matrices Q 
and (BS
-1B′-θΣ) are positive definite and the system is controllable. If G denotes the limit of 
Gt as t→∞, the postulated closed-loop state-space system is: 
 
(A9) xt+1  =  (A+BG) xt  +  εP t+1  =  AP xt   with   AP  ≡  [I + (BS
-1B′ - θ Σ) R ] A, 
 
where AP has all eigenvalues inside the unit circle. The actual closed-loop system satisfies: 
 
(A10) xt+1  =  AC xt + εt+1   with   AC ≡ A + B G = (I - θ Σ R) AP . 
 
Stability of  (A10) is not guaranteed if abs(θ) is too large. 
  The possibility of breakdown occurs if θ is so large that the matrix [Rs–(θΣ)
-1] is  no 
longer negative definite for s>t. In that case, the policy maker is faced with an inability to 
control and becomes paralysed. The policy maker’s pessimistic assessment of disturbances so 
outweighs its knowledge of its statistical distribution that his expected cost criterion becomes 
infinite. Hence, optimisation becomes pointless and the policy maker suffers a breakdown. 
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